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Abstract
We develop a real-options, capabilities-based model to analyze the corporate diversi-
fication decision, as well as determine the optimal timing and distance of investment.
We expand the model to include the optimization of investment size. Our model
predicts that opportunities, synergies, and the uncertainty over a firm’s relative ca-
pabilities determine the optimal scope, size and timing of investment consistent with
some of the existing empirical evidence. In line with previous literature, uncertainty
delays investment and increases investment size, as well as decreasing the cognitive
distance at which firms will diversify. We empirically test some of this implications,
and obtain support for our predictions.
Keywords: Real Options, Corporate Diversification, Resource-Based View
JEL codes: L25; D81; G31
Chapter 1
Introduction
Our company has indeed stumbled
onto some of its new products. But
never forget that you can only
stumble if you are moving.
Richard Carlton ex CEO 3M, 1950
One of the most important decisions companies are confronted with, once their
core segment reaches a certain size and maturity, is to (re)determine their scale
and scope, and decide whether to diversify or remain focused on its current sector,
running the risk of possibly being left behind or surpassed by competition if the
company becomes stagnant. This is a very complex decision, whose success is,
in many cases, noisy and hard to measure, and depends not only on the correct
understanding of market tendencies, but also on the firms capacity to enforce the
strategy efficiently, identify competitive advantages, and explore them, which can
be an incredibly difficult task in the current competitive, and fast-changed markets,
particularly when entering new growing industries, as is often the case. It is not
surprising that as such, corporate diversification as long been established as a central,
but controversial topic in the financial and strategic management literature, with
multiple theoretical views arising over the years, and conflicting empirical evidence
Palich et al. (2000)
The subject first raised considerable scholar attention, in the beginning of the sec-
ond half of the past century, with the rise of conglomerates in the US and in Europe.
So much so, that 63% of the Fortune 500 industrial companies in 1974, generated
more than a quarter of their revenue, from diversified activities, up from 30% in
1950. (Rumelt, 1974) . From the 1980s forward, big conglomerates were broken
up and corporate diversification, particularly unrelated diversification, was largely
seen as inefficient, as doubts grew regarding managerial motives and capabilities to
manage several businesses at once. Nowadays only a few of those conglomerates
remain, who have been able to maintain a successful diversification strategy over
the past years, such as General Electric and 3M.
However, corporate diversification is not only relevant for big conglomerates, but
an important component in the strategy of every firm. It is hard to imagine what
Apple be today if it was still just Apple Computers. Nevertheless, not all firms
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are successful, and able to derive real value from diversifying. An online survey
McKinsey (2015) conducted in 2014, found three-quarters of respondents companies
have pursued at least one business activity in a new category, over the previous five
years, while another 14 percent of companies have either considered doing so or plan
to do so in the next five years, which amounts to almost 9 in every 10 companies.
The capacity to access new profit pools (secure long-term growth outside the core
segment, or diversify risk exposure to the core segments business cycles) and to
strengthen the core business (acquiring skills or technology that are lacking in the
core business, or secure competitive advantages for the core business), were the main
motives presented for diversification, but only 28% of respondents say this move has
created significant value. Few executives consider their companies follow the best
practices that make diversification successful, and most often consider their company
struggle to scan for new opportunities, evaluate those opportunities, and integrate
new activities into the core business. Those who do so, for each of those three steps,
are around 2 times more likely to report creating significant value. Particularly,
both those who report having a clear strategy for expanding, and those who actively
review performance, are 4 times more likely to have generated significant value, to
those who dont.
Given this differences in performance, and the mixed empirical evidence, it is
not surprising managers have very little academic insights to rely on, when deciding
on whether to diversify, and mostly rely on instinct, as there is a lack of suitable
mathematical theoretical models which can be used to aid these decisions, or at
least force them to make explicit assumptions, that incorporate capabilities and the
true way managers reason on these issues. Furthermore, the link between industry
diversity, wealth and growth Hausmann et al. (2014), and inequality Hartmann
et al. (2017), has been shown in recent literature, which justifies policy makers
interest in diversification. Our goal is to determine the optimal distance, timing and
scale for a diversification investment, drawing from insight from the Resource-Based
View (RBV) and Dynamic Capabilities Approach (DCA), depending on the external
(uncertainty and opportunities) and internal (resources and capabilities) context of
the firm, to answer questions such as, do more (or less) capable firms move quicker
into closely related (or little related) businesses? How much should a firm invest to
maximize its benefits from diversification? How does uncertainty affect the value of
diversification opportunities?
We will do so by developing a real options model that reflects how the firms
resources and capabilities to seize opportunities, affect diversification decisions in
a context of uncertainty, incorporating a network-based view of relatedness which
stems from recent research such as the product space , first introduced in Hidalgo
et al. (2007), at a macro level, and develop in subsequent work. Real options are
becoming increasingly influential in strategic management, providing useful insights
into investment decisions Trigeorgis & Reuer (2017). In this decision, we can iden-
tify the main conditions which make a real options approach particularly useful:
uncertainty (regarding future cash-flows and the capabilities of the firm), flexibility
(regarding the timing, and size of the investment) and irreversibility (as there are
significant irreversible costs associated with the decision to diversify). Studying the
boundaries of the firm will allows us to broaden our understanding of how firms
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generate or destroy value, and so the study of corporate diversification provides
relevant insights and contributions to the way we understand firms and financial
theory in general. The paper will be structured as follows: the second section will
review the main different theoretical lenses through which diversification has been
analyzed and existing models, in the third section we develop our theoretical model
and analyze its predictions, in the fourth section we develop an extension to this
model, in the fifth section we test some of the model’s predictions, and finally we
conclude and comment on limitations and pathways for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Diversification
We will review on this section, some of the most pertinent empirical evidence, and
three of the main theoretical lenses used to analyze the complex phenomenon which
is diversification, and which provide different insights into this puzzle, despite many
aspects of different explanations being intertwined (for example Agency predictions
and the misallocation of capital by internal capital of markets).
2.1.1 Conflicting Empirical Evidence
Evidence of diversification is contradictory. If on one hand, there are indications,
that in general investors have positive reactions to diversification announcements
(Graham et al., 2002), other papers such as Morck et al. (1990) find evidence of a
negative reaction.The effect, of diversification on the value of firms is not straight-
forward and has been studied to be significantly influenced, by many factors.
Early studies on corporate diversification found significant evidence of a negative
relation between firm diversification and performance (ex: Berger & Ofek (1995) for
U.S. firms,Lins & Servaes (1999) for Japanese and UK firms). These results were
soon contested, as they failed to account for the endogeneity of the diversification
decision, the fact that firms who diversify and those who do not may have different
fundamental characteristics, which are the true responsible for the apparent diversi-
fication discount. Campa & Kedia (2002) find the diversification effect is statistically
insignificant and even more likely to be a premium rather than a discount firms, Hy-
land & Diltz (2002) find abnormal monthly returns in the 37 months surrounding the
diversification are not statistically different from 0, and Graham et al. (2002) find
only firms which become multi-segment through acquisition experience a value loss,
but that this loss is associated with the acquired company already being previously
discounted before the acquisition. Villalonga (2004), found that when controlling
for endogeneity, the diversification discount is no longer statistically significant with
results being robust to several changes in measures and samples. However, more
recent studies who also account for endogeneity, also present mixed results. Lam-
ont & Polk (2002) find exogenous increases in diversification destroy value, when
the company is already diversified, while Hoechle et al. (2012) find a discount which
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remains significant and negative even after considering endogeneity and control vari-
ables. Miller (2006) on the other hand, finds evidence diversified firms create more
value than specialized firms, and that this value increases with technological diver-
sity, which is a measure of the potential for economies of scope in knowledge assets,
after controlling for R&D and Capital intensity.
Some authors, explore the effect of diversification on productivity. John & Ofek
(1995) find that refocusing, through asset sales, increases operational performance
on the years following diversification, for the parent company. Desai & Jain (1999)
also find evidence that focusing spin-offs have higher abnormal returns, then non-
focusing spin-offs, and are associated with increased operational performance. Some
interpret these results as suggesting diversification may lead to inefficiencies, which
are corrected once the firm refocuses.Krishnaswami & Subramaniam (1999) also find
positive returns, which are positively related to the degree of information asymmetry
before the spin-off. C¸olak & Whited (2006) confirm that improvements in efficiency
usually follow divestments, however they show it is unlikely that this increase is
caused by refocusing. After controlling for the factors which increase the likelihood
of a company diversifying such as size, and measurement error in qs they find no
evidence of improvement in performance. They point out however, this might not be
the same for the allocation of other types of resources, such as managerial expertise.
Schoar (2002) finds diversified firms are more productive than stand-alone firms, and
that they increase the efficiency of the firms they acquire. However, diversification
destroys value dynamically as the productivity of the incumbent plants of the firm
diminishes, leading to a negative net effect on total productivity. Maksimovic &
Phillips (2008), also look at acquisitions as well as capital expenditures, and find
evidence conglomerates increased plant productivity both in post-acquisition and
for plant openings in growth industries.
2.1.2 Agency Theory
Agency Theory, pioneered by Jensen & Meckling (1976), gained preponderance
in the 1980s and theorized that diversification may be pursued by managers, in
their own interest, rather than in the interest of the shareholders they represent.
Empirical evidence supportive of a diversification discount, was thus perceived as
evidence of inefficient diversification, pursued by managers to increase their power,
perquisites or compensation, as managers over-invested into less profitable opportu-
nities (Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)) with the objective of reducing their own em-
ployment risk (their position, or reputation) (Amihud and Lev, 1981), or to increase
their entrenchment, by making manager-specific investments which increase costs
for shareholders to replace them Shleifer & Vishny (1989). These hypothesis were
supported by some empirical results, for example, Campa & Kedia (2002) observe
differences in ownership levels between diversifying and non-diversifying firms, and
that diversifying firm have more cash and poorer performance than peers. Berger
& Ofek (1995) report a 13 to 15% discount for US firms, identifying overinvestment
and subsidization of poorly performing segments as the main drivers of this discount.
Lins & Servaes (1999) find a diversification discount looking at 7 emerging countries,
concentrated in groups where possible agency problems are higher, and that own-
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ership structure influences the decision to diversify in these countries. Aggarwal &
Samwick (2003) find evidence in support of the view managers diversify to increase
private benefits, and that with increased benefits managers become less sensitive to
performance incentives. Hoechle et al. (2012) find evidence that a significant part
of the diversification discount (16 to 37% depending on the model) is explained by
poor corporate governance
2.1.3 Internal Capital Markets
Diversification allows companies to create internal capital markets, as compa-
nies may decide in which segment they wish to allocate their capital. Under this
perspective, diversification can both create or destroy value dependent on the level
of efficiency of the internal capital market generated. Diversification may create
value when it increases monitoring incentives and asset redeployability (Gertner
et al., 1994) or improves the reliability of capital supply, particularly helpful dur-
ing credit constraints (Liebeskind & Srogl, 2000). Finally, through improvements
in lender information as top managers face less asymmetry of information than ex-
ternal lenders, as long as gains are not offset by increased information asymmetry
for external investors (Krishnaswami et al., 1999). However, it may also destroy
value since as diversification increases, so does the potential for the miss-allocation
of capital. Diversification will destroy value if managers act as rent-seekers leading
to inefficiencies in the allocation of capital in internal capital markets, with the sub-
sidization of worse performing segments (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000), as investment
decisions become political battles (Rajan et al., 2000) (in line with the agency view),
Finally, diversification may reduce entrepreneurial incentives, as capital generated
in a segment may be used for another segment (Gertner et al., 1994). Wulf (2009)
defend that the quality of investment decisions of internal markets depends on the
quality of the information, public and private, available.
There is significant evidence that the value of diversification is affected by cap-
ital markets, and that the efficiency of internal capital markets varies considerably
depending on market and governance conditions. Diversified firms seem to have an
advantage over periods of financial constraints, but are more inefficient in times of
financial slack. Dimitrov & Tice (2006) find bank-dependent diversified firms (firms
which rely heavily on banks in order to have capital) have better performance, higher
growth of sales and inventories that their focused counterparts. Aggarwal & Zhao
(2009) find diversification to be value enhancing when external capital markets are
relatively inefficient(as in the case of emergent high-tech industries) and value de-
stroying in mature industries. Yan et al. (2010) and notice investment levels decrease
under external capital constraints for stand-alone firms during financial crisis, but
not for diversified firms, and that internal conglomerate capital allocation efficiency
increases as well. In contrast, Ozbas & Scharfstein (2009) observe unrelated seg-
ment firms, invest less in high-Q industries, than their stand-alone counterparts.
Hovakimian & Li (2011) find that during non-recession periods, internal capital
markets are inefficient as diversified companies allocate too much capital to low
growth opportunities, but that they enhance their efficiency, during recessions and
reallocate their capital to higher growth segments, especially those who were already
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under financial constraints before the recession. Glaser et al. (2013) identify cash
windfalls in multinational conglomerates, as a source of misallocation of capital, as
more powerful and well-connected managers obtain higher amounts of investment
rather than capital being efficiently allocated. Finally, Kuppuswamy & Villalonga
(2015) show that the value of diversification increased during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, due to both financing and investment advantages, as conglomerates increased
the efficiency of their internal allocation of capital significantly. Yet, they also found,
a subsequent decrease in the efficiency of the allocation of capital back to pre-crisis
levels.
In sum, evidence seems to suggest that for capital sufficient segments, diversifica-
tion carries higher costs than benefits, and that benefits should be higher the higher
the ratio of capital constrained segments, and the lesser the degree of development
of the external capital markets.
2.1.4 Diversification, RBV and the Dynamic Capability Ap-
proach
The Resource Based View (RBV), pioneered by Penrose (1959) and Wernerfelt
(1984), conceptualizes firms as bundles of resources, idiosyncratic and difficult-to-
imitate firm capabilities and assets, which are fundamental to create and maintain a
competitive advantage, and limit a firm’s capacity to expand. They argue firm deci-
sions depend not only on the opportunities it faces, but also the (not only financial)
resources it possesses to successfully undertake investments. Under this view, firms
are heterogenous, and resource endowments are difficult to change in the short-term,
because some resources are not readily tradeable, capabilities are difficult to develop
quickly, and as Lippman & Rumelt (1982) first noted, causal ambiguity limits the
ability to imitate successful firms. Furthermore, there is path dependence in a firms
development as expansion paths depend on past decisions resource, the firms busi-
ness processes, and market positions. Teece et al. (1997), first proposed the notion
of dynamic capabilities, updating the resource based view, referring to the ability to
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to achieve new
forms of competitive advantage and address rapidly changing environments (Helfat
& Peteraf (2009), address how the concept of dynamic capabilities was extended, to
incorporate the notion, that firms can use those capabilities, but are not required
to do so (they have an option), and that there must be some extent of intention).
If resources are central to firm success, the ability to learn, manage, destroy, re-
combine, acquire, and accumulate skills, organizational and intangible assets is thus
key to thrive in innovative and competitive environments, as firms must be able to
reinvent itself, embracing internal and external change, and to explore and create
new markets, while protecting against replication by rivals. Eisenhardt & Martin
(2000) view dynamic capabilities as a set of specific and identifiable processes, which
are idiosyncratic and path-dependent, but exhibit commonalities and allow firms to
reconfigure their resources, to sustain long-term comparative advantages. They are
more stable in moderately dynamic markets, where the emphasis is on small fre-
quent variations, with dynamic capabilities being embedded in the form of routines
in existing knowledge, and less predictable in very dynamic markets, where the em-
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phasis is on selection of what to keep from experience, and integrating new, specific
knowledge to adapt to changing environments, and find that dynamic capabilities
are influenced by well-known learning mechanisms, such as repeated practice or
experiencing crisis. Teece (2007)divides dynamic capabilities into three categories:
the capacity to sense and shape opportunities and threats, the capacity to seize
opportunities and the capacity to maintain competitiveness.
Sensing opportunities involves identifying emerging opportunities which are some-
times hard to discern. Entrepreneurs may have different access, different capacity to
interpret, shape or even create new knowledge and opportunities. Thus, to identify
new opportunities firms must constantly scan, and search for new technologies and
markets as the information filters and knowledge that previously made a company
successful can later constraint its growth. Management must find methods to gain
insight on the opportunities and lift the fog of uncertainty, given that attention is a
scarce resource (Simon, 1955) which must be carefully allocated.
Seizing refers to addressing the opportunity, and involves maintaining and im-
proving technological competences and complementary assets, i.e. knowing when,
where, how and how much to invest. The firms organizational capabilities and busi-
ness models are at least as crucial to be able to effectively take advantage of the
opportunities, as the physical technology to be used or market to be targeted. The
timing for commitment depends heavily on the nature of the opportunity, the firms
position, and existing resources. Firms may even avoid investing in radical innova-
tions which might render useless their previous competences, in favor of incremental
competency-enhancement investments, which build upon their already existing com-
petences. The companys current endowments can exacerbate decision making biases
against innovation, and lead to excessive risk aversion, and that is why it is impor-
tant for firms to be aware of the relationship between their established assets and
decision-making bias. These issues of co-specialization, opportunity costs and ir-
reversibility make seizing opportunities particularly challenging, and even more in
rapid changing environments, and our model will focus on this particular aspect. It
stems from this view the idea that related diversification, i.e. diversification into
segments which rely on the same resources and capabilities firms have, should be
more beneficial, has firms take advantage of their unique resource profile and exploit
complementaries.
2.1.5 Relatedness
Relatedness is a key aspect in the study of diversification from a resource-based
perspective, and more so in our model, and so we will present a more detailed
review of the subject. Relatedness, the degree of similarity between two segments is
a multidimensional concept, which has proven hard to measure from early studies
based on rather subjective criteria (Rumelt, 1974), through specific measures for
different activities (Coff, 1999) or through managerial surveys 1 Stimpert & Duhaime
(1997), which proved hard to generalize. The standard approach in the literature,
is measuring relatedness through SIC (Standard Industry Classification)-Codes or
similar measures (NACE, NAICS) , considering related businesses based on the
1refer to Pehrsson (2006) for a more complete review
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hierarchy defined by this measures (as those who share the first 2 or 3 digits).
Nevertheless its usefulness , this approach presents some limitations. Firstly, the SIC
system mostly reflects a logic of vertical structure and shared primary raw materials
(scattering competitors who produce substitute goods from different materials), and
for some categories (electrical equipment or apparel) end use plays a significant role.
It contains little information concerning strategical relationships, or the way firms
combine resources to create value (Bryce & Winter, 2009). Secondly the fact, that
they offer only a discrete view of relatedness, usually just a dichotomous related-
unrelated view of diversification, providing limited information about the degree of
diversification, and even possibly misleading information (consider that for example
SIC 2951, Paving Mixtures and Blocks, and SIC 3273, Concrete, Ready-Mixed, are
considered unrelated). It also fails to distinguish different relatedness levels between
different industries in the same group, which can be quite relevant.
Other aproaches were based on determining relatedness by observing the empir-
ical decisions made by firms (Folta & O’Brien, 2008). At a macro level, the work
of Hidalgo et al. (2007) as provided a macro view into relatedness, based on the
co-occurrence of products in countries export baskets,to build what they name as
the product space, defining each industries space in a network. They also calcu-
late a measure of the complexity, as they define it the amount of explicit and tacit
(know-how) knowledge required, of different industries. They find the complexity of
the basket of products a country produces is not only a better predictor of current
wealth, but a better predictor of growth than traditional variables Hausmann et al.
(2014), and that higher complexity is associated with lower inequality Hartmann
et al. (2017), which further justifies the interest of policy-makers in diversification,
in particular that into more complex goods. Subsequent work shows path depen-
dence in the way countries develop new capabilities, diversify into products which
are close to the ones they (Neffke et al., 2011)), or their neighbours (Bahar et al.,
2014) already export. Bryce & Winter (2009) developed a resource-based general
relatedness index based on information embedded in the multi-product organization
decisions of diversified firms, providing a percentile relatedness rank for all four-
digit SIC industry pairs which try to reflect the unobservable ways that firms share
resources among industry activities. The index is created on the assumption the
activity patterns of existing firms are good indicators of how resources and knowl-
edge relate across diverse activities, given that existing firms are repositories for
resources, skills, and knowledge. Industries are considered more related if a higher
percentage of firms simultaneously perform in both segments (similar to the product
space) than would be randomly expected. The general index is tested for predictive
validity and found to perform well.
Neffke et al. (2017) use a network approach based on Germanys social security
records labor flow data which spuns over 80% of the population, to derive a measure
of human-capital relatedness. Their argument spurs from assuming that human
capital is to some extent industry specic, and so labor-ows will be constrained and
will predominantly take place between industries which are more closely related, i.e.
with similar human-capital requirements. The resulting skill-relatedness network is
stable over time, independent of whether workers switch jobs locally or over larger
distances and similar for different types of workers (managers, sales, accountants,
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IT, etc) suggesting a non-negligible industry-specic component in human capital.
Finally, another recent development in measuring relatedness is through text
based analysys of corporate reports. Hoberg & Phillips (2016) create new indus-
trial classifications, departing from 10-K product words describe the features and
bundles of products each firm offers. They create two classifications: one similar
to SIC (which they distinguish as fixed) which holds its mains properties(namely
transitivity), and a general industry classification which can be represented as an
unrestricted network of firms. In this second network, each firm can have its own
distinct (time-varying) set of competitors, with significant empirical predictability.
Empirically, Kaplan & Weisbach (1992), analyzed acquisitions in the US from
1971 to 1982, and found firms are more likely to divest from unrelated segments.
However, they do not find evidence that unrelated acquisitions are less successful
than related acquisitions, with a third to half of the divestitures being considered
as unsuccessful, i.e. have incurred on a loss with the sale. Some studies report evi-
dence of better performance (or not as bad) in case of related diversification, such as
Berger & Ofek (1995) (measuring relatedness using two digit sic codes) and Helfat &
Lieberman (2002), who additionally find that firms and entrepreneurs which move
into segments related with their current/previous segment have higher survival rates
and are able to enter the market much quicker. Palich et al. (2000) conduct a meta-
analysis of over 50 studies, and conclude in favor of an inverted-U relationship
between performance and the degree of relatedness (moving from specialized, to re-
lated diversification to unrelated diversification). Maksimovic & Phillips (2008) find
more skilled firms in particular industries are more likely to maintain and increase
the productivity of the assets they acquire and keep in related industries. Other
studies, find no difference in the effect of related and non-related diversification,
such as Park (2002), who finds that after accounting for ex-ante differences (more
ex-ante profitable companies have higher propensity to persecute related diversifica-
tion strategies rather than unrelated diversification) and initial industry differences,
there is no significant effect on performance. Akbulut & Matsusaka (2010), studied
over 50 years of acquisitions, and found significantly positive combined returns for
diversifying mergers, not statistically different from those of related mergers (where
firms share at least one of the 6 major segments Sic codes). Neffke & Henning
(2013)examine firm level data, and find firms are over 100 times more likely to
diversify into closer industries.
2.1.6 External Factors
Besides the pointed explanations which are more primarily related to the internal
aspects of the firm, some research also focuses on the influence of external aspects
such as institutions and the competitive environment the firm is facing. Wright
et al. (2005) present the concept of institutional relatedness, the informal linkages
of an institution to dominant power which confer resources and legitimacy. They
propose that the higher the institutional relatedness, the larger the scope of the firm,
and the higher the development of capital markets and of formal market-supporting
institutions, the lower the scope of the firm. Furthermore, the benefits from insti-
tutional relatedness in developing countries is likely to be higher in the short term,
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as economies transition as better-connected firms may serve as intermediaries, and
lower in the long-term as the countries develop. Bowen & Wiersema (2005) study
the influence foreign competition may have on US firm diversification decision, and
found statistical support for their hypothesis that increased competition would re-
duce unrelated diversification, due to managerial constraints, and increase related
diversification, as firms try to better leverage the firms existing resources, and that
this result was stronger, i.e. higher focusing and increased interrelatedness of re-
sources, the more attractive the firms core business and the lower the previous
performance of the firm. Chakrabarti et al. (2007) find evidence of a diversifica-
tion premium only in less institutionally developed countries, studying firms from
6 different Asian countries with different levels of development, and a diversifica-
tion discount in more developed countries, with the benefits of diversification being
contingent on economic stability.Santalo & Becerra (2008) discovered that the effect
of diversification is not homogenous among industries, measured by four-digit SIC
code when analyzing a sample of US firms. They found a diversification premium,
where there is a small number of specialized competitors, or when they have a lower
market share, and a diversification discount otherwise, robust to industry size and
concentration and controlling for the self-selection bias.
Hoberg & Phillips (2010)nalyse 10-K product descriptions, and find mergers and
acquisitions are more likely between firms that use similar product market language.
Furthermore, performance improves for transactions with similar product market
language, with gains being larger for targets with unique products which are less
similar to the acquirer rivals. Kuppuswamy et al. (2014) investigate diversified public
firms from 38 different countries, over a 15-year period, and find diversification is
more valuable in countries with less developed labor and capital markets. What this
mixed evidence reveals, is that diversification will have different effects depending
on the characteristics of the firms, and the characteristics of the environment firms
operate in, and this must be reflected in the model.
2.2 Related Models
In this section, we will review in detail the existing dynamic models of diversifi-
cation as a value-maximizing strategy.
Matsusaka (2001) develops a dynamic model based on the notion of organiza-
tional capabilities. Firms own difficult to replicate (transfer) organizational capa-
bilities, meaning it might be beneficial for owners, that companies find other lines
of business, where these capabilities may be useful, instead of shutting down. The
paper explores the notion that diversification is a matching/search process for a
company to find a business with a good fit to its own capabilities, consistent with
empirical evidence from conglomerates acquisitions and divestitures in the 1960’S.
This stems from the uncertainty regarding the fit which can only be solved through
experimentation due to bounded rationality. This provides an explanation for some
mixed reactions to diversification announcements: diversification can be perceived
as good news, due to signalling there are organizational capabilities which are prof-
itable enough to avoid liquidation, or bad news signaling the company is in need
of exploring new possibilities. Furthermore, the model predicts diversifiers will act
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as risk lovers as the value of diversifcation increases with uncertainty as firms may
abandon the business in case of poor performance, while completely gaining from
the upside potential. Competition causes the erosion of a firms organizational fit
over time, and breeds diversification, since it is more likely that a companies advan-
tages will be eroded, the firm will search longer for better fits (smaller opportunity
cost in exploring new opportunities).
Bernardo & Chowdhry (2002), use a real options framework, to also explore the
value of the information that a firm may obtain regarding its resources (as they
define it, the capabilities, skills and assets of a company) in a context of uncertainty
when investing. They divide the resources a company may possess in two groups,
and define two projects the firm may undertake: general and specific, with general
resources influencing the cash-flows of all projects, and specific only influencing the
cash-flows of the specific project, with companies having the irreversible option to
expand at a given segment. Companies infer the total sum of resources they possess
while focused, but not which kind, and thus will experiment with the general project
to generate better signals (cash-flows, revenues, market share),before decide to focus
and expand the specialized project, or expand the general project. Their main
conclusion is a new explanation for the diversification discount: There is higher
uncertainty regarding a new firms resources, since it had less time to resolve this
uncertainty, which is associated with a higher value of the firm. As diversified
firms are usually more well-established older firm, there is less uncertainty regarding
their resources, and so young firms with the same expected resources will have
higher option value. Borghesi et al. (2007) and Hund et al. (2010) find empirical
evidence consistent with the view proposed in this model, that older firms with lower
uncertainty regarding their returns are less valuable than younger firms, where there
is more returns uncertainty.)
Gomes & Livdan (2004) depart from a neoclassical point of view, and show that
an apparent diversification discount is consistent with rational and efficient deci-
sions, in a context of decreasing returns to scale, firm heterogeneity (firm specific
productivity leels) and costly sector mobility. Their model shows that even before
taking into account any possible behavorial or agency problems, diversified firms
present lower value, while remaining nevertheless efficient, by allowing firms to ex-
plore new productive opportunities and synergies, and have lower cash-flow risk.
Firms will diversify once they become relatively unproductive, which endogenously,
given the interaction between firm size and productivity, generates the apparent
diversification discount. This is consistent with empirical evidence, such as Lang &
Stulz (1994), and other studies, who found that diversified firms had lower Tobin’s
q-ratio than focused firms.
Levinthal & Wu (2010), depart from a RBV, and distinguish scale-free from non-
scale free capabilities, firm specific capabilities who are subject to an opportunity
cost and must be allocated to only one segment. These are subject to imperfect
input markets, and might translate anything from the attention of the top manage-
ment team to scarce product capacity. Firms must decide how to allocate a given
capability stock between two different sectors. Capability allocation is not related to
scale, and firms are able to scale up at a constant marginal cost. They analyze the
effect on productivity and value of diversification under Bertrand and Cournot type
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competition . In the Bertrand model, the firm which is able to have a smaller cost
is able to serve the whole market. If that firm chooses to diversify, its profitability
and Tobin’s q will be smaller than the weighted average of the profitabilities for
focused firms in the two segments, due to a discount caused by the spreading of
non-scale free capabilities and dependent on the degree of fungibility of scale free
capabilities (how productive they are in the new segment). This is, nevertheless,
consistent with a value maximizing strategy, as firms maximize total profits rather
than marginal profits. Firms diversification decisions will differ depending on the
size of the markets, and on the capability assymetry between firms. More capable
firms will diversify first, and average returns will decrease.
Sakhartov & Folta (2014), take a very distinct approach and study how re-
source relatedness affect redeployability, formally defined as an american option to
withdraw an asset and apply it in another market. The traditional approach to
synergies, what they call intra-temporal economies of scope, relates to the contem-
poraneous sharing of assets, which allows savings due to reduced excess capacity, but
usually dismisses the possible inter-temporal economies of scope (Helfat & Eisen-
hardt, 2004), i.e. the redeployment of resources from one business to another over
time, which has particularly significant implications for the optimal timing of deci-
sions when making combined enter and exit decisions in dynamic environments, with
greater uncertainty, as it decreases irreversibility, allowing firms more flexibility over
the use of their resources. Resource sharing generates an increase in returns, either
be reducing costs or increasing revenues, positively related to relatedness. Firms
choose the asset allocation among the two different markets. Sakhartov & Folta
(2015) further study how model how return correlation between two industries, cur-
rent return advantage and volatility of the existing markets influence the value of
synergies and relatedness, and how they interact to affect the value of redeployabil-
ity. Sunk costs, uncertainty and market exit: In a real options perspective O’Brien
& Folta (2009) suggest that the value of keeping an option alive is smaller for related
firms due to lower sunk costs, but empirically find that firms are more likely to exit
industries that are unrelated to their businesses. Relatedness influences not only a
firms ability to leverage its resources but also how it might do so, as firms may more
easily enter and exit related industries. Attempting to differentiate ones products in
the industry via innovation may result in becoming locked into the industry because
of high sunk costs. Finally, Sakhartov (2017) demonstrate diversified firms are more
likely to combine moderately related businesses than the most related businesses,
given strong relatedness reduces redeployment costs and makes firms redeploy all
resources to better performing businesses.
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Chapter 3
Basic Model
3.1 Model Setup
As reviewed in previous sections, diversification is a complex decision, and agency
theory and internal capital markets have provided important insights, regarding fac-
tors which can significantly affect the value of diversification. However although they
provide insight over why firms diversify, they have limited potential in explaining
to where should firms diversify. In this dissertation we propose to develop a Real
Options model which will focus on a RBV/DCA, although it is possible adjustments
are made to accommodate other views. This is justified given the importance re-
sources, and strategic reasoning have on manager decisions (McKinsey, 2015) and
the potential this view recognizes for firms to create value through diversification.
We propose to contribute to the discussion on diversification, exploring the decision
from an unusual angle, hoping to provide testable insights regarding the external and
internal conditions under which diversification may be a value generating decision,
in order to contribute for a more holistic view of the phenomenon.
In our basic setting we consider a Firm, which is active in a given segment a,
having a capital stock of K1, who faces two important decisions regarding a possible
future investment: when and where to invest a K2 amount. The firm first decides
where to invest in order to maximize its value, and finally determines the optimal
moment to invest.
Our model (and the resource based view) implicitly assume managers are bounded
rationally, as initially proposed in Simon (1955) . They have limited attention and
specific competences (cognitive resources) which are hard to modify in the short
term, and so they do not possess all the information, nor the capacity to perfectly
interpret all available information. Even if managers can hire workers with a better
understanding than them, the manager must first be aware of possible opportuni-
ties which will motivate this hiring, as McKinsey (2015) show that companies are
likeliest to identify their executive teams and boards as the ones responsible for
evaluating opportunities in new categories. This implies that new investments will
change the portfolio of options, as they might be able to find new hidden opportu-
nities, or lose focus through diversification. Hence when deciding where to invest,
the firm considers the (cognitive) distance (or the inverse, relatedness) to the new
segment, d in our model, and the profile of the trade-off related to its capabilities.
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This distance where the firm may invest is normalized between 0, the current
core segment a and 1, a completely unrelated segment. In our model, we conceive
industries as occupying a position in an industry space. This conception of relat-
edness has some important implications. First of all, as shown in Hidalgo et al.
(2007), the decision to diversify is different across different industries, as it is thus
possible for some industries to be fairly well connected to many other, while others
can be poorly connected, leading to different decisions, diversification patterns, and
performance across industries. In our conception, a firm is more diversified if its
segments are more distant. For simplification in our model, the firm will only be
active in one segment prior to this decision, and considers only diversifying into one
new segment.
The closer the firm invests, the higher the potential for savings from shared re-
sources and capabilities, the more the company can benefit from its core capabilities
(Markides & Williamson, 1994) as it finds new ways to explore them, the larger
the benefit from switching options (from the ”redeployability”), since it can choose
in which segment it wishes to use the common capabilities and resources (Sakhar-
tov & Folta, 2014), and thus investing in closer projects helps alleviate the prob-
lems of irreversible decisions, as these capabilities and resources may be more easily
transfered to the initial segment , as well as benefit from inter-temporal economies
of scope, i.e. sharing the resources at a given time (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).
On the other hand, the closer the investment, the higher the option duplicates, as
well as the number of mutually exclusive options, which cannot be simultaneously
exercised (de Andre´s et al., 2014). Furthermore further expansion near the core
segment, might imply capabilities being over-used, reducing organizational slack
(Shayne Gary, 2005) which might hurt the firms capacity to pursue growth options,
reduce efficiency, or lead to deseconomies of scale, and increase coordination costs
(Zhou, 2011) which can counterbalance the possible gains. We desnote the net
gains or loses of relatedness as θc in our model. Throughout this paper, we refer to
synergies1(in a strict sense) as a synonym of θc.
The further away the firm decides to invest, from its initial segment, the larger
the potential for new growth options it may gain (due to, for example being more
capable to identify hidden options), the higher the likelihood it might combine its
capabilities, which are required to develop and pursue these options, in new ways
and add further value to the options it already possessed, and the new information
gained from being present in the new segment, may help improve the firm’s valuation
of existing options, reducing poor decisions and anticipating new value-generating
exercises of options, as well as larger potential for further options, resulting from the
conjugation of capabilities, from both segments. However given the firm’s limited
absorptive capacity ( (Cohen & Levinthal, 2000), if it moves too far away, up to
a point where the companies capabilities have limited to no use, it may lack the
necessary basis to understand and effectively explore the new market, and thus
hinder its capacity to reap the previously mentioned benefits, (citAndre´s). Finally,
given managers have limited attention, time and ability to process information the
1Although synergies usually refer to gains, we designate by synergies (etymologically: work +
together) the (positive or negative) result of combing two segments’ currently used resources and
capabilities of the firm.
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company may risk losing focus, and thus lose value on its already existing segment.
The net value of the gains and losses from distance (moving further away), is denoted
in our model as θop, and we consider θop is always > 0. Through out the paper we
will use opportunities as a synonym of θop.
In sum, there will be a trade-off between the advantages of diversification: in-
formation gained regarding resources and capabilities, cash-flows gained and new
options which might be revealed, and the costs of possibly losing focus: losing track
of possible profitable opportunities due to shifting attention, and splitting resources
and competences across industries.
As in Bernardo & Chowdhry (2002) the value of the firm is a function of its
capabilities(resources), and likewise we will not pinpoint specific resources or capa-
bilities which lead to better performance, as there are a number of problems with
trying to pinpoint the specific resources which are responsible for a sustained com-
petitive advantage 2 We assume X captures the relative fit of the total capabilities
of an active firm used in the current business, which follows a Geometric Brownian
Motion:
dX(t) = αX(t)dt+ σX(t)dz(t) (3.1.1)
where α is the risk-neutral drift rate, and is equal to r − δ, dz is the increment
of a Wiener process, and σ is the standard deviation. The firm is risk neutral
and discounts against rate r, the risk-neutral risk-free rate and δ represents the
opportunity cost for delaying investment, and is larger than 0.
The interpretation of these elements, given they relate to capabilities rather than
cash-flows, has some nuances: namely α represents the rate at which companies learn
new capabilities 3 , in relation to their competition, an α of zero implies the firm
expects its capabilities to evolve similarly to their average competitor, while for
example a negative α would mean the company expects its capabilities to develop
at a smaller pace than competitors implying the firm will lose some ground. σ
represents the volatility around the fitness of the capability in the market. The more
hyper-competitive (dynamic) a market is, and the more subject to major innovations
and disruptive competitive changes, the higher this volatility will be. A higher σ
thus implies, larger uncertainty around the usefulness of the firm’s capabilities.
For the sake of simplicity we also have to make some assumptions. As the firm can
have the same distance to two very different industries, with different profile of gains
and losses, given our network conception of relatedness, we assume the company has
already identified the most advantageous direction to follow although not the specific
industry(product) it will produce, and identified the profile of synergies across the
different distances. Furthermore, although capabilities vary over the long-term,
the firm cannot actively increase its capabilities in the short term, nor increase the
2see Sanchez (2009)
3Or find a way to better fit their current capabilities in their segment, we use improve capabil-
ities, fitness of capabilities and usefulness of capabilities as synonyms. An improvement of these
implies the increase of X, whether it came from learning a new capability or simply finding a
better use to an already existing one. We also use plural and singular form equally, as X, can be
understood as the value of a given capability, which is the only relevant one, or as a measure of
the value of a portfolio of capabilities
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capability growth in the long term. However, the firm can expand while maintaining
its current capability level. This is consistent which some findings on the literature,
such as Kor & Leblebici (2005) which find that that financial performance suffers
when firms diversify at a faster rate than what its current human capital can handle
as there is some stickiness on a firms human capital profile, and that productivity can
even be reduced when firms have a high reliance on external sources of human capital
(acquisitions). For such reasons, we consider the best case scenario, of constant
capabilities (returns may still vary, due to θc and θop, i.e., the company may benefit
from, for example, saving from the layoff of duplicate employees, or benefit from
using its current capabilities in new segments, respectively). Finally there are no
restraints to when the firm must make its decisions, i.e. the option has no expiration.
3.2 Optimal distance and timing
Considering our basic setting, in which a firm is deciding where and when to
invest a given amount K2, the payoff of the investment decision for the firm will be:
V (X, d) = X(1− d)K2 + θop(1− d)dK2 + θc(1− d)(K1 +K2)K2
K1
−K2 (3.2.1)
The payoff can be divided in the standalone value of the firm, plus the value of
opportunities and synergies from the investment decision. The (1 − d) component
in all terms translates the notion that the further away from the core segment,
the smaller benefits the firm will reap from its existing capabilities and sharing of
resources. This may be due to the firm being less efficient as it moves further away
from its core (Eckel & Neary, 2010), or due to the fact this capabilities are not
as effective in enhancing the quality of the output of the firm in the new segment
(Manova & Zhang (2012); Eckel et al. (2015)).
The first part of the payoff X(1− d)K2 translates the value the company will be
able to derive in the new segment, from its existing capabilities, without considering
the possible benefits from diversification itself., i.e. it is the value the firm would
generate from the segment if it only operated that single segment, and it depends
on the capabilities (in that segment, X(1 − d)) and investment size. The next two
components of the payoff, refer to the opportunities and synergies. The value the
firm obtains from opportunities, depends positively on the size of the new investment
and θop. Distance, however, has a non-linear effect. While on one hand, moving
further away increases the potential for opportunities, on the other hand it implies
fewer benefits (due to higher costs to adapt to the new segment, or smaller benefits
from already existing capabilities), this is translated in the d(1 − d) component.
Synergies on the other hand, relate to the combined value of both the new and the
old investment (K1 + K2), and are increasing with the investment size: if the new
investment is too small, the potential for sharing across segments, and exploring
relatedness is much smaller. Value from synergies is only derived if the company
makes a significant enough investment to materialize this benefits. On the other
hand, when θc is negative, for example if the resources or capabilities the company
depends on, are not abundant, the larger the investment, the larger the negative
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impact (from for example, reducing slack or increasing coordination costs). Finally,
the company will have to pay the investment cost K2.
We consider the firm first decides where to invest, and then when to invest. We
can determine the distance which maximizes firm value, through a simple optimiza-
tion exercise, by maximizing V (X, d) in order to d.
max
d∈[0,1]
[V (X, d)] (3.2.2)
Proposition 3.2.1 The optimal distance in which to invest, for a given K2 and
any X, is given by:
d∗(X) =
1
2
− XK1 − θc(K1 +K2)
2K1θop
(3.2.3)
This equation is the solution to the where to invest question, if we do not consider
the effect of uncertainty and the investment size is given. From the expression
we can see that , ceteris paribus, more capable firms would invest closer to the
original segment, and thus be less diversified (with the effect being mediated by
the opportunities of the new sector). As we will se in the example above, higher
synergies will imply closer optimal distance, and opportunities lead to increased
distance. Larger firms will invest further away, when synergies are positive than
smaller firms (smaller K1), under the same circumstances, and closer when they are
negative. As for investment size (K2), under positive synergies, the higher the K2
the closer the optimal distance, and under negative values the further away should
the firm invest.
Thus, the optimal diversification of a firm, when K2 is given, due to financial
constraints or managerial motives, depends on the size of the firm, and thus different
sized firms (or the same firm at different stages in time) will opt to diversify into
different segments, in the presence of the same synergies, opportunities, capabilities
and absolute investment size. Furthermore, if we relate synergies, to the industry
stage, assuming synergies will be mostly positive for most firms, on the early stages
of the industry as there is still a lot of market, resources and capabilities to explore,
and negative after a certain maturity is reached, so that increasing size will reduce
performance(reduced margins, increased organizational costs), the model suggests
very different optimal behaviors. In mature industries, smaller firms will diversify
further away, distancing themselves from the current sector to explore opportunities
more easily as they are less invested into the current sector and will suffer smaller
costs from moving (as well as larger relative benefits), while the larger the invest-
ment the further away it should be made in order to explore the opportunities and
minimize the effects of the costs of θc. In younger industries the opposite should
happen as larger firms invest (smaller investments) further away, while larger in-
vestments(or by smaller firms) should be made nearby in order to capitalize on the
industries core resources and synergies.
Following the definition of the optimal distance for any X, the firm must decide
on the timing of investment, in terms of the level of capabilities from which it is
optimal to diversify (indirectly, this also defines the value trigger).
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As is standard in the literature 4, the value of the option to invest, F (X, d), must
satisfy the following ordinary differential equation:
σ2X2
∂2F (X, d)
∂X2
+ (r − δ)X∂F (X, d
∗)
∂X
− rF (X, d∗) = 0 (3.2.4)
The solution to the ODE takes the general form:
F (X, d∗) = A1β1 + A2β2 (3.2.5)
where:
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√
(ασ2 − 1
2
)
2
+
2r
σ2
(3.2.6)
β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√
(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)
2
+
2r
σ2
(3.2.7)
As the payoff is that of a call option, i.e. increasing in X the solution, as is
standard in the literature, takes the form:
F (X, d∗) = A1β1 (3.2.8)
Which from now on, we designate as A and β (which must be greater than 1).
To determine the optimal timing X∗, we employ the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions:
lim
X→X∗
F (X∗, d∗) = V (X∗, d∗) (3.2.9)
lim
X→X∗
∂F (X, d)
∂X
= lim
X→X∗
∂V (X, d)
∂X
(3.2.10)
The value matching condition, equation 3.2.9, establishes that in the optimal
moment of investment the value of the option to defer the investment is zero, where
X∗ is the optimal investment trigger, i.e. the value of the option to invest is equal
to the present value of the risk-adjusted cash-flows the firm will receive. The final
condition, equation 3.2.10 ensures that F (X, d) is continuously differentiable along
X, and that F (X, d) and V (X, d) meet tangentially when X is equal to X∗. Solving
this system, we can show the option value of the diversification decision is given by:
F (X, d) =
{
A
(
X
X∗
)β
, for X < X∗
A for X > X∗
(3.2.11)
Where A is the payoff at the optimal moment of investment and is given by:
A =
K2(K2θc(−B +K2θc)−K1(B − 2K2θc)(θc + θop)−K12(4(−2 + β)θop + (θc + θop)2))
2K1
2(−2 + β)2θop
(3.2.12)
And B is equal to:
4view Dixit et al. (1994)
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B =
√
K22θc
2 + 2K1K2θc(θc + θop) +K1
2(4(−2 + β)βθop + (θc + θop)2) (3.2.13)
The optimal timing (capability level) to invest 5 is given by:
Proposition 3.2.2 The optimal timing for investment, at the optimal distance, and
a given K2 is given by:
X∗ =
−(−1 + β)(K2θc +K1(θc + θop)) +B
K1(−2 + β) (3.2.14)
The optimal timing for investment is negatively(positively) related to β (uncer-
tainty), in line with the literature that uncertainty leads to postponing investment.
Higher opportunities and synergies lead to earlier investments, as they both repre-
sent higher gains. The effect of firm and investment size is, once again, contingent
on the sign of θc. With positive synergies, the firm will invest sooner for larger K2 ,
or smaller K1, and so smaller firms will actually diversify sooner than larger firms,
ceteris paribus. The opposite happens for negative θc, and so under the previous as-
sumptions, in more mature industries larger firms will diversify sooner than smaller
firms (In these conditions, as larger firms will diversify sooner, than their equally
capable counterparts, it might be so that this leads to an apparent diversification
discount, if the sample is comprised of mostly larger firms in mature industries, as
the less capable firms are more likely to diversify, as they reach the threshold sooner,
it may be that the difference in capability is the true responsible for a discount.)
And the optimal distance, at the optimal timing will be:
Proposition 3.2.3 The optimal distance at which to invest K2 at the optimal tim-
ing is given by
d∗(X∗) =
(K1 +K2)θc +K1(−3 + 2β)θop −B
(2K1(−2 + β)θop) (3.2.15)
The introduction of the choice of timing and uncertainty has a significant effect
on the optimal distance. β (uncertainty) has a positive (negative) relationship with
distance (whenever the timing ∈ R+ ). And so in the presence of higher uncertainty
firms will opt to diversify near the core segment. Surprisingly synergies now act in
the same direction has opportunities: with higher synergies increasing the optimal
distance. Effects of firm and investment size also shift, although still contingent on
synergies. With positive synergies, distance is decreasing in K1 and increasing in
K2. In negative synergies the opposite, now occurs. So under flexibility to define
timing and uncertainty, larger firms (or for smaller investments) in mature industries
will diversify further away (or for larger investments), while in a young stage of the
industry lifecycle it will be smaller firms which will move further away.
5There is another value for X, which satisfies the conditions, but it does not produce valid
results, i.e. where 0 ≤ d∗ ≤ 1 , X ∈ and a positive V (X∗, d∗)
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3.3 Numerical Example
In this subsection, we will explore a numerical example to shed light on the
model’s intuition.
Variable Value
K1 100
K2 50
X 1
θc -0.2
θop 2.5
α 0
σ 0.15
r 0.1
Table 3.1: Base case parameters
The base case parameters are described in Table 3.1.
First we will look at the trigger, and the decision of the investment timing.
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Figure 3.1: Investment trigger, uncertainty, synergies and opportunities
Effects are generally unambiguous, and as Figure 3.1 shows uncertainty increases
the value of waiting and so leads to later investment, while higher synergies and
opportunities increase the value of the investment and reduce the trigger. However,
when it comes to investment and firm size the effect is contingent on the sign of
θc as we see in Figure 3.2. With negative synergies, larger firms will invest sooner,
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or those which make smaller investments, between two same size firms, while with
positive synergies, the opposite happens.
(a) Negative θc (b) Positive θc
Figure 3.2: Trigger and Synergies
We can also analyze the conjunct effects of uncertainty and opportunities as in
Figure 3.3, which shows both variables play a significant role on the decision of the
timing. A very high level of uncertainty requires very large opportunities in order
for a firm to even invest. y 9o0
Figure 3.3: Trigger,θop Uncertainty
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between the effects of opportunities and syner-
gies. Synergies seem to have a stronger relative effect effect when they are negative,
then when they are positive.
When it comes to distance we can do an analogous analysis. Uncertainty reduces
the optimal distance, while on the other hand opportunities and synergies lead to
higher diversification, as shown in figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Trigger, θc θop
θop=2θop=2.5θop=3
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
σ
TD
di
st
an
ce
(a) θop
θc=-0.6θc=-0.2θc=0.2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
σ
TD
di
st
an
ce
(b) θc
Figure 3.5: Distance, uncertainty and inducements
By looking at investment and firm size in Figure 3.6, we can see that for a
negative θc larger firms will invest further away, while for a positive value, smaller
firms will have a higher optimal investment distance.
We can also take this numerical example to examine, and better understand,
why do firms diversify in our model.
In order to do so, we compare the payoff of investing a given value in the original
segment at a moment in time (in order to compare values at different triggers as
suggested by (Dixit et al., 1994)), and investing it at the optimal distance and at
half the optimal distance, in Figure 3.7. The vertical line marks the optimal timing
for investment at the optimal distance, which happens when X hits 1.377. At that
moment, diversification generates a value of 13.98, much higher than the 3.86 the
firm would obtain investing in the same segment. If X decreases, diversification still
creates a positive value, while remaining focused (i.e. investing at distance 0) would
lead to negative returns. This shows that if firms have capital available for invest-
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(a) Negative θc (b) Positive θc
Figure 3.6: Distance, Size and Synergies
ment, and yet do not possess significant enough capabilities to generate value in the
current sector, it can nevertheless create value for shareholders through diversifica-
tion. However, as X increases we can see that the premium of diversification over
focusing decreases. This is due to the X(1 − d)K2 component of the payoff. As X
increases, so does the cost of diversification, as the value loss from the imperfect ap-
plication of capabilities increases in absolute terms. These costs become so high that,
as we can see from around where X hits 2(if we consider the return of investment,
instead of the total value, then this happens only X is around 3.5), diversification
results in a loss of value. So very well performing firms have a higher absolute cost
of diversification, and, in limit an infinitely capable firm would not diversify without
uncertainty. However, as there is uncertainty, if capabilities significantly decrease for
any reason, diversification serve as insurance and guarantees a better performance.
This implies, companies would benefit from diversification whether to increase re-
turns when capabilities are low, and as a guarantee of value when they are high,
since if for some reason the competitive advantage the firm would dissipate, and X
would decrease, the firm becomes better off as it still explores the opportunities in
the new segment(as well as now having a smaller opportunity cost for diversification
as less capabilities are ”dissipated” in diversifying).
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Figure 3.7: Dynamic Value of Diversification
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Chapter 4
Extension to the basic model
4.1 Distance and timing with optimal capacity
In this chapter, we consider that beyond the previous decisions, the firm now
must also decide the investment size K2. In order to do this however, we must
restrict the model to the analysis of cases where θc < 0. When synergies are positive,
although there is still a trade-off between synergies and opportunities when deciding
on the distance, a bigger investment always generates a higher return, as synergies
are increasing in K2. So in such situations, companies will simply invest as much
as possible, and can determine the distance and timing through the previous model
(with their maximum investment capacity being K2). Regardless, the most common
and interesting cases are those were θc < 0, where the firm faces some loss in
efficiency (due to higher coordination costs, salaries, lost of slack and attention
sharing between the two segments hurting the initial segment performance) as a
trade-off to expand and be able to explore the new opportunities. The payoff will
remain the one presented in equation 3.2.1
First, we must determine the optimal distance and size of the investment, for
any given capability level. We can find the stationary points by solving the system:{
∂V (X,d,K2)
∂K2
= 0
∂V (X,d,K2)
∂d
= 0
(4.1.1)
{
∂2V (X,d,K2)
∂2K2
< 0
∂2V (X,d,K2)
∂2d
< 0
(4.1.2)
These points will be a maximum/minimum in the regions where:
(
∂2V (X, d,K2)
∂2K2
)(
∂2V (X, d,K2)
∂2d
)− (∂
2V (X, d,K2)
∂d, ∂K2
)2 > 0 (4.1.3)
The limits of this region translate the notion that, K1 must be large enough for the
firm to diversify, the opportunities must compensate the losses of θc, and if X is too
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high the firm should already have invested. This region is defined by :
−θop ≤ θc < 0
0 < X ≤ −θc + θop
K1 > − 3K2θc2X+2θc+2θop
(4.1.4)
and 
−θop ≤ θc < 0
−θc + θop < X < −θc + 5θop
− 3K2θc
2X+2θc+2θop
< K1 ≤ − K2θcX+θc−θc
(4.1.5)
These points will be maximums, since in our interval 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 , K2 > 0, K1 > 0
θop > 0 and θc < 0, and so:{
∂2V (X,d,K2)
∂2K2
= 2(1−d)θc
K1
< 0
∂2V (X,d,K2)
∂2d
= −2K2θop < 0
(4.1.6)
The optimal K2 and d , for any given X will be given by:
K2
∗(d∗, X) =
K1(−2(X + θc + θop) +
√
12θop + (X + θc + θop)2)
3θc
(4.1.7)
d∗(K2∗, X) = −X + θc − 5θop +
√
12θop + (X + θc + θop)2
6θop
(4.1.8)
Firstly, note that the optimal distance for K2=K
∗
2 is the same in both models.
Once again, this results present the optimal solution without considering the effect
of uncertainty or flexibility to decide the timing. The distance is still negatively
affected by the capability level of the firm, and by θc and positively by θop. When
it comes to capital the firm will invest a multiple of its initial investment. Firms
with higher capabilities will make bigger investments then those with smaller ca-
pabilities in the same conditions. Curiously, higher opportunities, ceteris paribus,
lead to smaller investments, has firms can take advantage of the opportunities while
trying to minimize the costs due to θc. θc on the other hand is positively related to
investment size.
In sum, the effect on distance is far different from that on capital. An increase
in X, or θc, leads to bigger, closer investments. Higher θop leads to smaller, further
away investments.
We obtain the value of the investment option in an analogous procedure to what
we have done above, and obtain:
F (X, d∗, K2∗) =
{
A
(
X
X∗
)β
, for X < X∗
A for X > X∗
(4.1.9)
Where A is the investment payoff at the optimal moment and is given by:
A = (X∗ + d∗θop)(1− d∗)K2∗ + θc(1− d∗)(K1 +K2∗)K2
∗
K1
−K2∗ (4.1.10)
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Proposition 4.1.1 The optimal timing (capability level) to invest 1 K2
∗, at d∗ is
given by:
X∗(K2∗, d∗) =
β(−(−2 + β)(θc + θop) +
√
4 (−3 + β)(−1 + β)θop + (θc + θop)2)
(−3 + β)(−1 + β)
(4.1.11)
The optimal timing follows similar behavior as the previous model, increasing with
uncertainty, and decreasing with opportunities and synergies. Firm, and investment
size no longer influence the trigger.
Proposition 4.1.2 The optimal distance is given by
d∗ =
−θc − 5θop + β(−(−2 + β)(θc + θop) +
√
4(−3 + β)(−1 + β)θop + (θc + θop)2)
(−3 + β)(−1 + β) + C
6θop
(4.1.12)
with:
C =
√
[12θop + (3θc + 3θop − 2β(θc + θop) + β
√
4(−3 + β)(−1 + β)θop + (θc + θop)2)2
(3− 4β + β2)2
(4.1.13)
Once Again, and as we will see in the numerical example, the behavior is the
same: uncertainty reduces distance, while synergies and opportunities are both pos-
itively associated with the optimal distance. Different sized firms will now opt to
invest into the same segment (if the opportunities and synergies are perceived to be
the same, which might not always be the case as they may relate to firm’s capabili-
ties and so even the same industries may present different value for different firms.)
Finally,
Proposition 4.1.3 The optimal capital investment is given by
K2
∗(X∗, d∗) =
K1(−2(3θc+3θop−2β(θc+θop)+β
√
4(−3+β)(−1+β)θop+(θc+θop)2)
(−3+β)(−1+β) + C)
3θc
(4.1.14)
The optimal capital investment is a multiplier of the firm size, and is increasing
with uncertainty, as in other similar literature (Huberts et al. (2015)). The opti-
mal capacity is increasing with synergies, but decreasing with the opportunities as
previously mentioned, (analogous to what is observed in (Hund et al., 2010)).
1There are other values for X, which satisfy the conditions, but it does not produce valid results,
i.e. where 0 ≤ d∗ ≤ 1, X∗ ∈ R+ , 0 ≤ K∗2 and a positive V (X∗, d∗)
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4.2 Numerical Example
Consider the same base parameters, previously presented in Table 3.1 Distance
and the trigger are both influenced in similar ways to the previous model, with
the main differences being that now opportunities, synergies and uncertainty have
a stronger effect, and firm size is no longer a determinant of investment, since for
firms which only differ in size, both decisions will be unchanged. The size of the
company will only affect the amount being invested, as firms which only differ in size
will invest an equal percentage of their already existing investment (but different
absolute values), at the same moment and distance. This is due to the flexibility of
choosing investment size. So we focus on the capital decision.
Firms will invest up to the point where their marginal gain from an additional
infinitesimal unit of investment is 0. As an increase in θop increases the (marginally
constant) gains of K2, one would expect that the optimal investment would increase,
as the firm can invest up to higher marginal costs (since costs are increasing in K2).
However, the effect we observe is actually the opposite of this, as can be seen in
figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Capital, opportunities and uncertainty
This is because there are also indirect effects of the changes in the optimal trigger
and distance. An increase of opportunities, lead to an increase of the optimal dis-
tance, which actually should increase the optimal K2 being invested (as the marginal
gains increase). However, the indirect effects of opportunities due to the trigger,
dominates this effect, and actually leads to a much earlier and smaller investment.
In order to visualize this, for different opportunity levels, we multiply the optimal
investment size by the stochastic discount factor, K2
∗( X
X∗ )
β,to have a comparable
”present value” of investment, which should control the effects of the changes in the
trigger.This is shown in Figure 4.2, and it is visible the effect of opportunities on
the stochastically discounted amount invested is actually significantly positive, due
to the combined previous effects mentioned.
An increase in synergies, will lead to a decreased marginal cost which allows the
firm to invest additional units of capital profitably, as can be seen in Figure 4.3 (this
effect is reinforced in terms of the stochastically discounted value).
28
θop=2θop=2.5θop=3
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
X
K2
(X X*)
β
Figure 4.2: Stochastically discounted value of Investment and Opportunities
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Figure 4.3: Capital, synergies and uncertainty
From the previous figures, we can also infer the positive relationship between
uncertainty and capital investment. This is due to the fact, that under more un-
certainty, the option to invest is more valuable, and so firms will choose to delay
investment. Using a similar procedure as before, we can see that the effect on the
stochastically discounted value of investment is actually negative. This is caused by
the changes in distance: lower uncertainty leads to higher optimal distance invest-
ments, which mean the firms can benefit more from opportunities due to changes in
θop(1− d)d (with distance below 0.5), and simultaneously have lower costs, because
of the decrease in the (1−d)θc component, which should lead to larger investments.
This is exactly what happens in figure 4.4
Finally, and to summarize we can analyze the value of decision to diversify and
on the capital amount decision (When it comes to timing, it is a well established
subject, investing before the optimal timing, destroys the value of the option to wait
at that moment.)
For example, at the optimal trigger, and investing the optimal amount, what is
the value of the where decision. We calculate the value for the different decisions and
divide by the value created investing the optimal distance. At optimal distance, this
value is obviously 1. We can see there are significant differences between decisions,
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Figure 4.4: Stochastically discounted value of Investment and Uncertainty
and diversifying can in this case create almost 40% value in comparison with being
focused, i.e. invested at 0.
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Figure 4.5: Value of deciding where to invest
The decision on how much to invest, is particularly important, as it is a center
issue for the Agency and Internal Capital Markets views. We calculate the value
at the optimal moment of investment, at the optimal distance, for every K2 and
divide te by the value for the optimal K2. (Note that calculating this ratio allows
for comparison, as it is the same than multiplying by any X
X∗
β
for each K2 , i.e.
discounting the value stochastically as (Dixit et al., 1994) suggest. And dividing by
the also discounted value for the optimal K2. This presentation as the advantage of
being independent of the selection of X, as long as X is below the exercise of the
option).
From Figure 4.6 we can analyze two things, when it comes to situations where
there are negative synergies: firstly in the left hand sign of the graph, even if man-
agers act optimally, if they are restricted on capital they will create less value than if
they could invest the optimal. Furthermore, given the relationship K2 to d identified
in figure ??, they will diversify further away, meaning they will benefit more from
diversification if they evolve to be less capable, and less if they are more, when com-
paring to the optimal scenario. Second, and perhaps the more relevant, is that the
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Figure 4.6: Value of Capacity decision
same happens if the firm invests a higher than optimal amount: the firm generates
less value in absolute terms, even when it behaves optimally. While the slope is less
accentuated for investments higher than the optimal, which could seem less danger-
ous, one must keep in mind that not only the total value is decreasing, the amount
of capital invested is increasing so the rate of return is decreasing significantly. So
if for some reason, such as empire building, managers opt to invest as high amount
as possible, rather than just the optimal amount, they will be destroying significant
shareholder value.
4.3 Overconfidence
The framing of our model can be useful to analyze not only the causes and con-
sequences of diversification, but also be used to analyze and incorporate dynamic
capabilities ( just as an example, we could capture a higher capacity for sensing
opportunities, leading to higher θop, or a higher capability to relocate translating in
changing (1−d) component of the payoff, into (1−φd) , with 0 < φ ≤ 1 translating
smaller losses from shifting industry, and exploit the possible effects on these deci-
sions) and behavorial biases. As an example, we will look at overconfidence(OC).
Overconfidence has been studied from as far back as the 1960’s in psychology, and
can be simply defined as an unwarranted belief in the correctness of ones answers
Koriat et al. (1980). The relationship between overconfidence and corporate diver-
sification, has been explored as far back as Roll (1986), who looks at mergers and
acquisitions, and posits that managers of acquiror firms overestimate the value of
targets, which would lead to targets experiencing higher gains than acquirors. How-
ever, they didn’t find empirical evidence to be conclusive on whether this is true.
Malmendier & Tate (2008) tested for this hypothesis, based on their measure of over-
confidence, and found that a) Over-confident CEOs are more likely of making an
acquisition, b) that Overconfident CEOs are statistically significantly more likely to
do diversifying mergers (different Fama 48-Industries) but not intra-industry acqui-
sitions, and that c) market reactions are significantly more negative for acquisitions
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of overconfident managers. Andreou et al. (2017) also present a theoretical model
that links CEO overconfidence and diversification, and empirically find diversified
firms run by overconfident CEOs experience a value loss compared to those run by
non-overconfident managers.
Adhering to the view of overconfidence as mis-calibration or unrealistic optimism
(Skala (2008)), our model presents an interesting basis to theorize on the effect of
overconfidence on corporate diversification, since its factors allow us to distinguish
different types of overconfidence with different consequences. In the model’s lan-
guage, overconfidence can be translated in (at least) 4 different ways: managers
may be overconfidence about their current capability level (X), on the future evolu-
tion of their capabilities (α), on the opportunity gains of diversification (θop) or on
the coordination costs of diversification (θc), which will have a different impact on
the decisions made by the firm.
Consider our base case parameters, in Table 3.1 we calculate how much does
overconfidence affect the decisions 2 made by firms, and the results are presented in
the Table 4.1:
Type OC K2 d X
∗ Value at X = 1.5
No OC 301.81 0.235 2.13 40.49
Xo 301.81 0.235 1.93 38.64
αo 485.89 0.144 2.95 37.30
θop
o 227.80 0.342 1.61 33.28
θc
o 358.61 0.242 2.02 37.06
θc
o and θop
o 266.86 0.347 18.59 18.41
Table 4.1: Overconfidence
The simplest case is the one where managers are overconfident about their current
abilities X. In this case, the decisions are unchanged, but the manager invests too
soon and loses the option value resulting in the value loss in the table. When
managers overestimate α, it means they expect their relative capabilities to increase
more then reality. Overestimating α means underestimating the β, which leads
to delayed investment, and a much smaller optimal distance. The effect of delayed
investment dominates the effect on capital, and so the firm will invest a higher capital
amount. When it comes to opportunities, an overestimation of opportunities will
lead to a reduced trigger and a higher distance, and a much smaller investment
size. Overestimating θc (for example: underestimating coordination costs) will also
reduce the trigger as is the case for opportunities. However unlike opportunities
they lead to larger investments and a (slightly) higher investment distance. Finally
we also observe the combine effect of overestimating opportunities and synergies,
i.e. overestimating inducements by 20%. This leads to earlier, smaller investments
at a much higher distance. All types of overconfidence destroy some value, and
the combination of the inducements overconfidence proves to be particularly value
destroying.
2Xo = X + 0.02, αo = α+ 0.01, θop
o = θop + 0.5, θc
o = θc + 0.04
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We can enrich our analysis by looking at the payoff after the firm is invested
(before investing, the unbiased option dominates all other investments):
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Figure 4.7: Value of Investment OC, after commitment
Overconfidence regarding θop, is in particular much less valuable, around the
trigger for that decision, so the decision should be from the offset value destroying
(this conclusion can lead to an empirical prediction for example that if firms are
too optimistic when it comes to opportunities/growth in new markets it should
generate a stronger more negative announcement) and only generates higher value
than the optimal decision, in the unlikely case of a positive evolution of X. When
it comes to θc there is little difference in value around the trigger. The decision
generates a little more value if capabilities drop, but proves to be very negative
if the firm’s capabilities evolve positively (a possible empirical test would be: if
coordination costs/synergies prove to be higher than expected, and firms increases
their performance in the core segment the firm should be more likely to divest).
When it comes to the combination of overconfidence, the effect of overestimating θc
seems to dominate. Finally, when it comes to α when the option is exercised it is
a value-generating exercise. The problem in this case, rests in the significant value
the firm loses for lower values of X, for only exercising its option too late (and too
close).
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Chapter 5
Empirical Test
In this section we set to empirically test some of the main hypothesis of our
model, regarding the decision over the distance of investment. From the previous
model, we can set the following testable predictions:
Hypothesis 1 Relative uncertainty over the capabilities of the firm, should be neg-
atively correlated with investment distance, this should manifest in two ways: a)
across different industries and b) across different countries
Hypothesis 2 Opportunities should be positively correlated with investment dis-
tance.
And finally,
Hypothesis 3 Synergies should be positively correlated with higher investment dis-
tance.
5.1 Data
We use the Zephyr database to retrieve data on worldwide mergers and acquisi-
tions, which were announced between 01/01/2010 and 01/01/2017, and are already
completed. We consider only deals where the acquiror’s initial stake was bellow 10%
. Furthermore, we only consider cases where the Acquiror is from United States of
America (US), China (CN), Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Hong Kong (HK), Japan
(JP), Mexico (MX), Russian Federation (RU), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), Colombia
(CO), India (IN), Korea, Republic of (KR), Singapore (SG) or the enlarged Euro-
pean Union (28 countries), and obtain a sample of around 160 thousand acquisitions.
We consider a firms segment to be its primary segment as obtained from Zephyr.
For our analysis, we consider only the diversification acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions
of firms in a different 4 digit Sic code industry, which reduces the sample to 80 392
acquisitions. Furthermore, we exclude acquisitions from firms in the financial sector
(as defined in the Fama 48 industry classification), which finally reduce our sample
to around 58 thousand acquisitions. We then retrieve the financial data of compa-
nies that participated in this acquisitions through the Amadeus database, from 2008
to the present. We have financial information from 41 130 different acquiring firms
and 38774 targets.
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5.2 Measures
Uncertainty (σ)
A key variable in our model is the uncertainty over the relative capabilities of
a firm, σ. Higher uncertainty over the relative capabilities should relate to bigger
changes in marginal returns of firms investments. As it is a proxy measure of relative
capabilities, our proxy should relate to the likelihood a competitor can develop
capabilities which undermine the value of the firm. Secondly, our proxy should relate
to the manager’s perception of competition, since decisions (pricing, investment, etc)
will be made by managers with base on their believes: it is perceptions which will
shape timing and investment decisions, while a ”true” level of competition measure
should have a bigger impact on the results of diversification. As a proxy of this
uncertainty we adopt the measure of competition created by Li et al. (2013). Their
measure is simple: to count the number of references to competition (competition,
competitor, competitive, compete, competing, and plural forms) in the firms 10-K
filing, removing references where not, less, few, or limited precedes the word by three
or fewer words, scaled by the total number of words, as presented in Figure 5.2.1.
PCTCOMP =
Number of Competition related Words
Total number of words
(5.2.1)
We denote ACComp which is the median value of PCTCOMP, for the firms in
each Fama 48 industry, as a proxy of competition, and TAComp is the same value
in the target firm.
Since firms should reflect on the firm’s competitive position, by recommenda-
tion from the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), this should reflect in our
measure. The basic idea is that more intense behavior from new and existing rivals
diminishes a firms ability to earn profits. This measure has some advantages: it does
not require identification of the source of competiton (e.g. threat of new entrants,
or existing rivals, private or public, national or foreign competitors), is persistent
over time and was tested empirically with good results, as returns mean revert more
severely, and that returns on new investment in net operating assets (NOA) diminish
faster, when management makes more references to competition, which is exactly
what we would expect from higher uncertainty regarding negative capabilities. Fur-
thermore, since we use the calculations for the Fama 48 industry classifications, this
allow us to have a more enlarged set of competitors than the firm-specific, or 4 code
SIC approaches (For example, Apple(SIC:8742) competes with Microsoft (SIC:7372),
Samsung (Samsung Electronics SIC: 5731) ,Amazon(SIC:5961), and Google(7374)
in both the hardware and software industries, which would not be considered to be
even related by SIC hierarchy measures). Finally, in many cases when managers
use these words they are exactly commenting on the possibility that competitors
erode their profits, if they have the capabilities to develop similar products or ser-
vices. Competition is usually associated with the erosion of firm’s profits in the
real options literature, but the association with the upside of volatility is not usual.
In our case, volatility relates to relative capabilities rather than cash-flows directly.
Our main argument, would be that bigger competition forces existing companies
into innovating, developing new products, developing, combining and creating new
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capabilities which in turn also generates larger variations in the firm value, i.e. com-
petition breeds the use and development of capabilities(generating higher rewards
for successful, and bigger losses for less successful firms). Plus, if some firms are
having their abnormal profits eroded, other firms should be increasing their returns
generating higher increases in value (even if divided by higher number of firms, and
consumers) through increased capabilities.
Other measures of competition, have flaws or do a worst job at capturing the
specific dimension we wish to capture. Cross-Elasticity based measures are success-
fully used but only in manufacturing industries, concentration based measures are
usually built with public firm datas, which many times do not adequately translate
the firms competitive environment (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung [2009] and Bens et al.
(2011) and Dedman & Lennox (2009)), and capture different information.
Additionally, we proxy the uncertainty regarding capabilities in different coun-
tries, through the GCI- obtained from the World Economic Forum’s global com-
petitiveness report. We consider the average value from between 2008 and 2009,
for all countries, so that all major variables are calculated in the same period, and
denote it as GCIAC, the value of the GCI in the acquiror’s country, and GCITA,
the equivalent measure for the target’s country.
Distance (d)
As previously reviewed there are many different possible measures of relatedness,
we opt to use the Neffke et al. (2017) measure. As previously discussed, the core
assumption of this measure, is that job changes should be easier if the production
processes in the two industries draw upon more similar skills, and then quantifying
the extent to which cross-industry labor flows exceed a well-defined baseline. This
measure presents significant advantages over other measures of relatedness. Firstly,
it extends to all firms, and not just manufacturing firms, such as the Product Space.
Secondly, it is a direct measure of human capital relatedness, and so adjusts to our
capabilities view of relatedness, while other approaches, capture other elements of
relatedness as well, such as input or output relatedness. Thirdly, the measure seems
to be relatively stable, across time and geographic decision (if people change jobs
through long or small distances). Furthermore it does not assume anything about
the coherence of corporate portfolios such as measures which derive such results from
empirical observation (i.e. we are assuming correlations from employees individual
decisions, and not firm decisions, and so firm decisions and the standard to which
they are compared are independent). And finally, it is much easier to apply to a
large sample, unlike survey-based measures.
Previous research as already established a negative correlation between distance
and the propensity to diversify into a given sector. And the fact 3.3% of the connec-
tions between industries account for 80% of all job switches, as 56% of pairs do not
observe any job switches whatsoever, reinforce our confidence in the significance of
such relationships
We depart from this measure, whose result is a value between 1 and -1, symmetric
in 0, we will designate by S, that translates a notion of skill relatedness, with -1 being
the most distant segment, and 1 the segment itself. We create our distance measure,
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to be decreasing in relatedness and bounded between 0 and 1, such that:
Distance = 1− S + 1
2
(5.2.2)
Thus our measure captures the cognitive distance between different segments.
Opportunities (θop)
We proxy the opportunities in a given segment, through the median Tobin’s q
of firms operating in that segment in our dataset, in a given year. Our measure is
the median for each segment for each year, designated by θˆop of:
Opportunities =
Book value of debt+ Market Cap
Total assets
(5.2.3)
The assumption is that the market will be pricing the opportunities of growth
in that sector in already active firms: the higher this value the higher the expected
growth in the sector (as through the median, we control for individual variation),
which the firm might explore through its capabilities.
Synergies (θc)
We calculate synergies as the elasticity of Return on Assets, as obtained directly
from Amadeus, to changes in total assets except cash. Namely we calculate:
Synergies =
ROAi −ROAi−1
(TAi − Ci)− (TAi−1 − Ci−1)
TAi−1 − Ci−1
(5.2.4)
with TA Being total assets, and C equal to cash and equivalents. We calculate
the median for each year, for each 4 digit sector in order to have a sector and
year synergy measure. A high value, signifies that firms can still obtain significant
increases in ROA by increasing scale (or lose significant value, by reducing size)
which indicates the potential of future synergies. On the other hand, a negative
value indicates, firms experience a diminished rate of return with an increase in
assets which might be a sign of industry maturity or excessive coordenation costs.
In addition, we create qttcneg, which classifies in 4 quartiles, from lowest values to
highest, for negative values of thetac given our final model makes predictions only
for negative θc firms.
Control Variables
Finally we collect other financial information, in order to calculate industry wide
financial ratios. Namely we calculate the median of the average of the past three
years in the winsorized ratio for the firms involved in transactions in a given year.
Debt and Cash serve as proxies for leverage and the amount of capital available
for firms to invest. We expect larger Cash reserves to be negatively related with
financial constraints. Under negative θc we expect this will lead to smaller distances
(as K2 increases). On the other hand debt can affect both sides: since it can help
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Abbreviation Description
DTA1 Total Debt over total assets
TQ 2 Tobin’s q
IFAFA Intangible over total fixed assets
CTA Cash over total assets
FATA Fixed over total assets
RDOR R&D spending over Operating Revenues
PM Profit margin
ACDQ1 % Of industries closer than 0.25 from acquiror
ACDQ2 % Of industries between 0.25 and 0.5 from acquiror
TDQ1 Of industries closer than 0.25 from target
TDQ2 Of industries between 0.25 and 0.5 from target
TAXTA Of industries between 0.25 and 0.5 from target
LOGTA Of industries between 0.25 and 0.5 from target
Table 5.1: Controls
provide higher external control over managers, limiting their capacity to deviate
from stakeholders interests. If that is the case, it should lead to smaller distances.
However, if it is such that is constraints managers it should lead to smaller, and
thus further away investments if managers act accordingly to our model.
Intangible assets and R&D investment should proxy for capabilities, and RDOR
in particular can arguably proxy for the future expectations of the development of
capabilities (α). Both should have a negative relationship with distance.
We include the Tobin’s q as is usual in the literature, and can also be perceived
as a measure of the firms capabilities and ease of access to capital, so it should be
negatively correlated
Fixed Assets can in a sense proxy for capital intensity and the possibility of
synergies (since higher fixed costs lead to higher possible economies of scale gains),
and such should as synergies be negatively related to distance.
LOGTA is the natural log of the total assets, we should expect that has firms
grow larger the potential to realize new synergies will decrease, which should lead to
an increase in diversification. TAXTA is the amount of taxes paid, with an increased
tax rate, firms will have increased benefits from a possible tax shield an acquisition
operation may create, which should like an increase in opportunities motivate firms
to move further away, by decreasing downside risk.
Finally, given some industries are better connected than others it may occur
that they simply invest closer or further away due to the fact they have a higher
or smaller number of firms nearby. We consider ACDQ1 and ACDQ2 as proxies
to help account for the connectedness of the Acquiror, and TADQ1 and TADQ2 to
that of the target firm.
5.3 Summary Statistics
Table 5.2 we present the summary statistics on the previously presented variables:
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(1)
count mean sd min max
Distance (d) 79,703 .408 .309 .001 1
ACcomp 108,847 .525 .093 .144 .692
GCIAC 137,252 5.21 .462 4.02 5.67
DTA 110,421 .889 .279 0 3.26
TQ 73,442 .8 .278 .161 1.72
TAcomp 118,744 .518 .092 .144 .692
IFAFA 109,723 .277 .270 0 .987
CTA 109,796 .097 .086 .0 .8651385
FATA 110,356 .441 .188 0 .982
θop 73,713 .799 .279 .161 1.72
PM 110,509 5.15 9.20 -54.43 51.58
θc 106,348 .084 100.75 -1714.25 1873.60
RDOR 55,638 4.71 5.69 .01 48.54
ACDQ1 136,982 .032 .013 .002 .072
ACDQ2 136,982 .08 .051 0 .33
TADQ1 135,615 .032 .013 .002 .072
TADQ2 135,615 .083 .051 0 .209
GCIAC 134,619 5.17 .487 4.02 5.67
LOGTA 114,169 10.04 1.99 2.78 16.52
TAXTA 108,623 .012 .013 -.063 .125
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 5.1: Competition and Investment Distance
The average distance at which firms diversify is 0.408, with significant standard
deviation. When it comes to uncertainty, our adopted proxy ACComp varies be-
tween 0.144 and 0.692, a significant degree of variation. Target firms are in mean
in slightly less competitive segments. The GCI average score is 5.21, with variation
from 4 to about 5.67, since most transactions come from higher scored countries.
The median industry Tobin’s q measure varies signficantly between 0.16 to 1.72
along with opportunities, and when it comes to fixed assets, and the nature of those
assets, results are extremely polarized, with Fixed assets representing on average
around 44% of total assets, and intangibles around 28% of these values. Profit mar-
gins vary significantly as well between plus and minus 50%. There are industries
where firms opt to reinvest almost none of their revenues, while others invest almost
half to RD. Synergies vary between -1700 to 1873, which implies firms can create
(destroy) up to around 18 monetary units for each invested unit of capital. Finally,
on average, only 3% of firms are closer than 0.25, with significant variation and the
same can be said for the following quartile, where some firms might have around
30% of all industries nearby while others have none. Finally, different industries
vary signficantly in size and the amount of taxes paid
In figure 5.1, we represent the box-plot of the distance of investment, over differ-
ent levels of competition. The graph presents us the distance at which firms diversify,
divided in 9 different groups. The large division is between country competitiveness
ratings (i.e. the first three left bars, are for the same country) while the second divi-
sion is based on industry competitiveness. We can see there are several, significant
differences, across these groups. For example, looking at the most extreme cases:
The median distance for the more competitive industries, in the most competitive
countries is around 0.25, while the median for less competitive is twice as much.
Further more, 3 quarters of diversifications can be considered related (distance ¡0.5)
for the competitive industries, while for the less competitive only around 50% of the
diversification decisions are into related segments. The difference among just the
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industries groups is also visibly significant 3.
5.4 Main Results
We conduct a Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of distance on our ex-
planatory variables. We used pooled OLS as date revealed itself to be non significant,
if we account for other variables. We use an Ordinary Least Squares estimation as
described in equation 4 5.4.1:
dˆ = β0+β1ACComp+β2TAComp+β3GCIAC+β4GCITA+β5θˆop+β6qttcneg+Controls+i
(5.4.1)
In table 5.3 we have the results for our main regressions, which are generally in
line with our predictions.
In all regressions, our measure of industry competition presents a highly signif-
icant (pvalue of over 0.000) negative correlation, as predicted by our model. The
target competition presents similar values. Our country level measure of compe-
tition also present significant results in all models, although less significant in the
end. The connectedness of firms, its position in an industry space, also proves to
be significant. Especially, having more really close industries significantly decreases
the expected diversification distance (keep in mind, on average this value is around
3%) and likewise for the target position in the industry network. Opportunities
increase significantly the expected distance of diversification which is in line with
our predictions, and are particularly significant in the second model. Synergies how-
ever, do not relate to distance as expected: an increase in synergies is associated
with a reduction of the distance, which would be consistent with the model when
we disregard the future evolution of capabilities in our decisions. When it comes
to the control variables, once they are introduced, they seem to capture some of
the effect of our models variables. In the second model, Intangibles are significantly
negatively related with distance, as one would expect, if we consider these a proxy
for capabilities. Cash has a highly significant effect, curiously negative effect on dis-
tance: it would be expected through our models predictions that as firms increase
their capital they decrease their investment distance. These results present no real
answer for the agency theory view, as we do not know if firms are on the restricted
or excess investment size regarding the optimal levels: this result may coexist with
diversification destroying value through overinvestment as managers pursue their
3More competitive firms are better connected, which could be the cause for this effect. For
robustness we calculated the percentage of firms invested into every quartile of distance (distance
between 0-0.25,0.25-5, etc) for each industry group. We divided this value by the percentages of
industries at that range for the median firm at a competition group. Differences were all statistically
significant at a 1% level. In the most competitive tercile, firms are 20% more likely to invest into
the closest segment to invest at a distance between 0-0.25, and the least competitive firms are 60&
more likely to diversify at a distance between 0.75-1, given that they have diversified. Results are
also statistically different at a 1% level for divisions in terciles from opportunities and synergies.
4We have as a robustness check used robust standard errors. The main conclusions remain and
are even more statistically significant, with exception to changes in significance for some control
variables.
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Table 5.3: Distance -Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ACComp -0.645∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.097∗∗∗(0.022) -0.185∗∗∗(0.028)
TAComp -0.125∗∗∗(0.025) -0.508∗∗∗(0.021)
ACDQ1 -2.468∗∗∗(0.187) -2.148∗∗∗(0.164) -2.058∗∗∗(0.195)
ACDQ2 0.465∗∗∗(0.045) 0.400∗∗(0.036) 0.009 (0.045)
TADQ1 -2.345∗∗∗(0.189) -2.808∗∗∗(0.154)
TADQ2 0.219∗∗∗(0.041) 0.344∗∗∗(0.033)
GCIAC -0.029∗∗∗(0.007) -0.022∗∗∗(0.005) -0.016∗∗(0.006)
GCITA -0.021∗∗∗(0.006) -0.013∗∗∗(0.005) -0.003 (0.006)
θˆop 0.015
∗(0.007) 0.081∗∗∗(0.005)
qttcneg -0.020∗∗∗(0.002) 0.010∗∗∗(0.002) -0.004∗(0.002)
TQ 0.009(0.007) -0.010(0.009)
DTA 0.016(0.012) -0.051∗∗∗(0.015)
IFAFA -0.078∗∗(0.007) 0.002 (0.009)
CASHTA -0.278∗∗∗(0.036) -0.264∗∗∗(0.050)
FATA -0.060∗∗∗(0.014) -0.082∗∗∗(0.018)
PM -0.004∗∗∗(0.000) -0.001(0.001)
RDOR -0.002∗∗∗(0.000) -0.003∗∗∗(0.000)
TAXTA 0.973∗∗∗ (0.202) 0.983∗∗∗(0.255)
LOGTA 0.009∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
cons 1.151∗∗∗(0.027) 0.840∗∗∗(0.033) 0.687∗∗∗(0.037)
N 17300 20831 14370
Adj R2 0.1132 0.1504 0.4158
Fixed Target Effects No No YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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interest. Debt is only statistically significant in the last model, and has a surpris-
ingly negative effect on distance. Fixed over total assets, also have a significant
relationship, as expected in accordance with the view as a proxy of synergies. Prof-
itability reduces the average distance in the first model, through reducing financial
constraints, allowing for bigger, closer investments or as a signal of higher capabil-
ities, but is not statistically significant in the second. R&D once again behaves as
expected: if firms expect their capabilities to grow further in the future they should
invest at closer distances (R&D is the variable which significantly decreases the
strength of the effect of our competition variables, which makes sense as it is often
used to proxy competition together with advertising). Firms which pay a higher
level of taxes, invest further away which is consistent with the view that tax shield
represents an (financial) opportunity and reduces downsize risk. Finally firm size is
positively related with distance, consistent with the view that as firms grow in size
they have more limited capacity to make investments. There is no baseline compar-
ison to understand how well our model performs through analyzing the R-Squared,
as there is not, to our understanding a model which tests similar hypothesis (Tate,
G. A., Yang, L. (2015). The Human Factor in Acquisitions: Cross-Industry Labor
Mobility and Corporate Diversification. would be the closest, but focus exclusevely
on human capital). As a baseline comparison, a regression of the same sample, using
only fixed effects for target and acquiror industries presents leads us to an r-squared
of around 0.47, and just fixed effects of the acquiror have an adjusted r-squared of
0.1148 so we believe that we have captured the most relevant determinants of this
decision. Overall we confirm all of our main hypothesis, and most predictions over
the effect of the additional control variables, which brings us close to underpinning
the value drivers of these decisions, and find what motivates sector choices.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
We had set out to exploit the central issue of corporate diversification, and try
to contribute to the already vast, and often contradictory, empirical evidence. We
started by reviewing the literature, exposing some of the main issues such as endo-
geneity and the suitability and use of different measures of value and relatedness. We
identified the significant contributions from different perspetives: Agency Theory,
Internal capital markets and the Resource Based View, as well as focus on how exter-
nal factors influence the decision making and results of diversification, and present
some of the most significant models on diversification. We develop our model in
a RBV framework, since it is the one which is most concerned with where invest-
ments are made. We proceed to develop a Real Options model, which allows us to
account for uncertainty and flexibility, while further adding the where perspective
to traditional RO models, which are usually focus on timing or capacity. We argue
firms will consider the stand-alone value of the investment plus the value of both
synergies, which are increasing in relatedness, and opportunties, which are increas-
ing in distance up to a certain point. Our first model focuses only on timing and
investment distance, and has fairly unambiguous results: higher β (lower uncertainy
or α, or higher r) leads to higher optimal distance and earlier investments. Oppor-
tunities and synergies are both positively related to distance and timing. Ambiguity
arises depending on the values of synergies. In the presence of positive synergies,
bigger firms will invest closer than smaller firms, while the opposite happens if θc
is negative. Once we introduce capacity, these results remain consistent. We find
that in according to literature, higher uncertainty increases investment, as well as
synergies, while opportunities reduce investment size. We show that, this happens
mostly due to the effect off the trigger, and if we consider a stochastically discounted
investment value, than opportuntites actually increase investment size as one would
expect. Our analysis of the model also produces insights over why firms pursue
diversification, and why it may appear to be value destroying. By comparing the
value of an investment at the optimal distance and at the firm’s original segments.
Diversification creates values at around the optimal moment of investment, but it
destroys value in case the firm’s capabilities have a very positive evolution, while
minimizing the value loss in case they decrease. Furthermore, we relate to the in-
ternal capital markets and agency concerns, and show the dangers of under and
over investment: underinvestment leads to steeply decreased value creation (plus
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the firm, will opt to be more diversified, which might be value destroying in case of
a positive evolution of capabilities). Overinvestment, also destroys absolute value
aggravated by the fact the firm is also investing higher amounts of value. Finally,
we depart from our view of diversification as an optimal decision, and show that if
investors are overconfident they will show different investment patterns, depending
on how it manifests itself, namely to overestimating opportunities, underestimat-
ing coordenation costs, current capabilities or the future evolution of capabilities.
All these decisions, destroy value, but differently. The combination of overestimat-
ing opportunities while underestimating coordination costs seems particularly value
destroying.
Finally, we empirically test some of our main predictions, and obtain evidence
which seem to suggest similar relations as predicted by our model. Further research
must still establish and surpass many limitations. Empirically, the construction
of better measures that allow to capture the intuition exposed by the model is a
significant limitation. Survey based measures, might prove to be useful in this case.
Endogeneity and correlation issues also prove significant challenges in inferring a
causal relationship.
There are many avenues for future research, both empirically and theoretically.
Theoretically, it might be interesting to analyze opportunities and synergies as sto-
casthic, or to analyze a previous decision, on an investment to reveal opportunities
and synergies and the implications it might have. In addition, it would also be
interesting to expand the model so that firms might have an influence on their cur-
rent or future level of capabilities through investments. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to analyze the implications, on the symmetrical exit decision, and how
in turn that option to abandon will influence entry decisions. Finally, the model
can be expanded to include the opportunity to invest in several sectors, rather than
just one.
Empirically, we focused on the determinants of the diversification decision. It
should be interesting to analyze the results, and effects on performance of diversifi-
cation. Furthermore, the model provides the basis to analyze timing and capacity
investment decisions as well. The focus, can also be shifted from M&A to greenfield
investments, or to analyze different industries. Furthermore, some empirical tests
may be made from the predictions on overconfidence.
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